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The fact that labor market regulations are at the cornerstone of
the debate on economic policy and political economy in many coun-
tries shows that changes in regulations may have nontrivial effects.
At the very least, they have different consequences for protected and
unprotected groups. They may also face interesting tradeoffs, specifi-
cally regarding efficiency and equity. In this paper, we empirically
study one particular ingredient of this type of tradeoff, namely, the
effect of labor regulations on income distribution.
For that purpose, we present evidence on the impact of labor
regulations on income inequality using two recently published data-
bases on labor institutions (or de jure regulations) and outcomes (or
de facto regulations) (Rama and Artecona, 2002; Djankov and others,
2003). We consider other country characteristics that may affect in-
come distribution, including income level and growth, education, and
the structure of the economy. We use a battery of cross-section and
panel data analysis techniques to evaluate the robustness of the re-
sults. In particular, we use cross-section ordinary least squares (OLS),
pooled OLS, OLS with time and country fixed effects, cross-section
instrumental variables (IV), IV with time and country fixed effects,
and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The sample
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we consider covers 121 countries over the 1970–2000 period. We focus
on two groups: the total sample and the sample of developing countries.
This paper is closely related to Calderón and Chong (in this vol-
ume) and should, in certain dimensions, be taken as its complement.
To begin with, it is based on the same data sets (except for inequality)
and considers similar estimation techniques. Taken together, the
papers allow the reader to determine whether the tradeoff mentioned
above exists and to evaluate its relative importance.
We report four main findings. First, de jure regulations (that is,
what the labor codes prescribe) do not improve income inequality.
Our results using the Rama-Artecona database are not robust, but in
a few cases, they indicate that regulations worsen income distribu-
tion. When we consider the Djankov–La Porta data set, we find that
regulations on employment and industrial relations (although not on
social security) do have a negative effect on income distribution.
Second, compliance with labor regulations, measured as the ratio
between a de facto index and a de jure index, has a positive effect on
income distribution. Since this result cannot be explained by summing
up the individual effects of each index separately, it may capture insti-
tutional development rather than labor market considerations.
Third, de facto regulations are weakly associated with a better
income distribution. This result could be due to endogeneity of labor
regulations. When we control for this problem, the effect frequently
is not different from zero, although in some cases these regulations
improve income distribution.
Finally, aside from the endogeneity problem, these mixed results
are partly explained by the fact that the results can differ markedly
across specific de facto regulations. In this regard, the most robust re-
sults are the following: minimum wages, especially when measured as a
percentage of per capita income, worsen income inequality; trade union
membership (as a percentage of the labor force) has a positive effect on
income distribution, although its effect on the poorest 20 percent is smaller
and less robust than for the middle class; government employment at
the general level (less so at the central level) has a positive effect on
income distribution, but no effect on the poorest quintile; days of mater-
nity leave have a positive effect on income distribution; and neither the
ratification of the International Labor Organization’s convention 87 nor
social security contributions has a robust effect on income inequality
across estimation methods and samples.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief lit-
erature review on the impact of labor market regulations on incomeLabor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 223
inequality. Section 2 reviews the data sets and the methodology we
use. Section 3 presents the results of the different estimation tech-
niques. Section 4 discusses our overall results and concludes.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
In a seminal paper, Kuznets (1955) argues that the relation be-
tween income inequality and the level of development follows an in-
verted-U-shaped curve. Inequality rises in the face of economic
expansion during the initial stages of development, and it declines
afterwards. The relation stipulated by Kuznets has recently been simu-
lated successfully within a general equilibrium framework (Galor and
Tsiddon, 1996). Recent evidence also shows that unemployment is
one of the major sources of inequality (Jenkins, 1995, 1996) and labor
market policies are a potential instrument for reducing inequality
(Rama, 2001a).
Saint-Paul (1999) claims that labor markets institutions across the
world usually consist of tax systems or other transfer mechanisms
that shift resources from the working to the nonworking population.
These institutions include unemployment benefits, employment
protection laws, and active employment policies by the government.
Some analysts argue that these institutions are necessary to protect
workers from bad outcomes and unexpected shocks (Blanchard, in this
volume). In general, labor market institutions are supposed to help
achieve socially desirable redistributive goals (Emerson and Dramais,
1988; Rama, 2001a, 2003). In this context, labor market policies may
be an effective tool for reducing income inequality, but there is
increasing debate on the benefits of labor policies such as minimum
wages, mandated benefits, collective bargaining, job security, and public
sector employment in developing countries (Rama, 2001a, 2003).
Regarding the imposition of minimum wages, Saint-Paul (1994)
argues that it may have an adverse effect on the income distribution.
Minimum wages redistribute income from skilled to unskilled labor,
as well as from the poorest to the lower-middle quintiles by generat-
ing unemployment.1 Microeconomic studies suggest that the impact
1. Saint-Paul (1994) claims that minimum wages create unemployment among
unskilled workers and reduce the income of skilled workers, thus lowering out-
put. In addition, the impact of minimum wages on inequality is affected by other
forms of labor rigidities. For example, income is shared equally among unskilled
workers in a world with high job turnover, so minimum wages have a small
impact on inequality among the unskilled.224 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
of minimum wages on income inequality is small in many developing
countries (Maloney and Nuñez, 2001). On the other hand, Rama (2001b)
analyzes the doubling of minimum wages (in real terms) in Indonesia
in the early 1990s. He finds that the elasticity of average to minimum
wages was approximately 10 percent over this period, and the dou-
bling of minimum wages was associated with a slight decline in total
wage employment and a substantial increase in unemployment among
small enterprises. Trade union membership, in turn, seems to guar-
antee a higher wage for union members relative to nonmembers.
However, union wage premiums in developing countries is smaller
than among industrial countries. This finding may be due to the role
of trade unions in keeping wage rates invariant in periods of eco-
nomic adjustment (Nelson, 1991).
Rama (2001a) reviews studies on the impact of public sector em-
ployment on income inequality. Public sector wages could have a sig-
nificant effect on private sector wages in countries with a small formal
sector, as in sub-Saharan Africa, (Rama, 2000).
The impact of separation costs on employment and income distri-
bution depends on the tightness of job security regulations. Fallon
and Lucas (1991) find that very strict regulations on job security de-
pressed labor demand in India and Zimbabwe. Separation costs—in
the form of mandatory severance payments—may also reduce the
level of employment (Heckman and Pagés, 2000).
Rama (2003) analyzes the impact of labor market interventions
on indicators of income inequality after controlling for some of their
determinants.2 He shows that social security programs help reduce
income inequality. Collective bargaining is less effective at improv-
ing the income distribution: its impact is statistically significant only
for the share of the second richest quintile of the population. The
core conventions supported by the International Labor Organization
(ILO) seem ineffective for reducing inequality.3 In summary, coun-
tries pushing to adopt ILO labor standards, raise minimum wages, or
expand government employment may not generate any significant
effect on inequality.
Finally, Vanhoudt (1997) analyzes the impact of labor market poli-
cies on income inequality in member countries of the Organization
2. Rama (2003) includes the following as determinants of income inequality:
educational attainment, civil liberties, and financial development.
3. According to Rama, the core ILO conventions are those addressing the abo-
lition of forced labor, the effective elimination of child labor, nondiscrimination in
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He finds that
the Gini coefficient is not affected by labor market policies, although
other measures of inequality are. Specifically, he finds that active
labor market policies—such as expenditures for public employment
services, labor market training, and subsidized employment—improve
the income share of the bottom quintiles of the population and re-
duce the income gap between the top and bottom quintiles. Passive
labor markets—that is, income compensation schemes—have a neg-
ligible impact.
2. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section describes the database used in our regression analy-
sis, as well as our estimation strategy. Since our discussion draws
heavily on Calderón and Chong (in this volume), we present only a
brief description of both the data and the methodology used.
2.1 The Data
We use two recently developed databases on labor regulations to
test whether labor regulations have been an effective tool for reduc-
ing income inequality: namely, the Rama-Artecona database (Rama
and Artecona, 2002) and the Djankov–La Porta database (Djankov
and others, 2003).4
The Rama-Artecona Database
Rama and Artecona (2002) collect data on labor market regulations
and outcomes in 121 countries over the period 1945–99. The data is
organized in five-year averages and distinguishes between de jure regu-
lation and de facto regulation. De jure regulation is approximated by
the number of ILO standards ratified by the national labor laws.5 De
facto regulation is approximated by information on categories such as
4. This subsection draws heavily on Calderón and Chong (in this volume).
5. The ratified conventions included in this index encompass universal legis-
lation on issues such as child labor, compulsory labor, equal remuneration for
male and female workers, equal opportunity, the right of collective bargaining,
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minimum wages, conditions of work and benefits, trade union member-
ship and collective bargaining, and public sector employment. The dis-
tinction between de jure and de facto regulation is very important because
the ability of developing countries to enforce the regulations stipulated
in their labor laws is quite limited (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput, 1997).
We define aggregate indices of the overall extent of labor regula-
tions in the economy following the strategy pursued by Rama (1995)
and Forteza and Rama (2002). We define an index of de jure regula-
tion, L0, as the cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified by a
country over time. This index reflects the ideal regulatory frame-
work of the country from an institutionalist point of view (Freeman,
1993a, 1993b), while it also captures the thickness of the labor code
(Forteza and Rama, 2002). The L0 index includes the ratification of
ILO conventions on the minimum age of employment, compulsory
labor, the abolition of forced labor, equal remuneration for men and
women, the right to collective bargaining, and the discrimination on
equality of opportunity or conditions of employment on the basis of
race, religion, sex, political opinion, or social origin. However, the
number of existing regulations does not give us information on a
country’s ability to implement and enforce these regulations. For this
reason, we require an index that reflects the practical extent of labor
regulations instead of their number.
Rama (1995) constructs an aggregate index of de facto regulations
using information on the following four categories: minimum wages,
mandated benefits, trade union membership, and public sector em-
ployment. Unfortunately, data on job separation costs are only avail-
able for a quite limited sample of countries.6 Following Rama (1995)
and Forteza and Rama (2002), we construct two aggregate indices of de
facto labor regulations, both of which include different proxies for these
four dimensions. The first aggregate index of labor de facto regula-
tions, L1, includes the simple average of the ratio of the minimum
wage to unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector; social security
contributions as a percentage of salaries; total trade union member-
ship as a percentage of total labor force; and the share of general gov-
ernment employment in total employment. The second aggregate index
of de facto regulations, L2, comprises the simple average of the ratio of
6. Heckman and Pagés (2000) construct data on job separation costs for Latin
America; they find that these costs have a substantial impact on the level of
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minimum wage to income per capita; the number of days of maternity
leave for a first child born without complications; the ratification of
ILO convention 87, which allows workers to establish organizations;
and the ratio of central government employment to total employment.
To make all these variables comparable across countries, we nor-
malize all the labor market regulation indicators in such a way that
their values fluctuate between zero and one, with one representing
the highest practical extent of labor regulation and zero the lowest.
The aggregate indices of de facto regulation, L1 and L2, are computed
for countries with at least two of the four dimensions involved in the
analysis.
The Djankov-La Porta Database
Djankov and others (2003) evaluate the degree of labor market
regulation in the labor codes of eighty-five countries. Their sample
thus represents a cross-section of labor regulation indices for a broad
sample of countries. Since these measures are extracted from labor
codes, they are closer in spirit to de jure labor rigidities than de facto
enforcement.
These measures focus on three types of labor laws: employment
laws, industrial relations laws, and social security laws. Employment
laws contemplate the laws governing individual employment contracts
in the economy. This type of law specifically regulates aspects of indi-
vidual labor contracts, terms of reference, and contract termination.
It covers the restrictions placed on alternative employment contracts,
the conditions of the employment contract, and job security.
Industrial relations laws regulate the adoption, bargaining, and
enforcement of collective agreements, the unionization of workers,
and industrial actions by workers and employers. These laws capture
aspects of the worker-employer relationship, such as collective bar-
gaining, the participation of workers in the company’s management,
and the resolution of collective disputes (such as strikes and lockouts).
Finally, social security laws contemplate the social response to
quality-of-life conditions and requirements. They protect workers
against the risk of disability, sickness, and unemployment.
Income Inequality and its Determinants
The dependent variable in our regression analysis is the Gini co-
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and Squire (1996), but this source only covers through 1995. For the
final five years, we extrapolate data for income shares and the Gini
coefficient for the countries present in the analysis of Milanovic (2002a,
2002b). For countries that are absent in Milanovic’s papers, we gen-
erate information on the Gini coefficient based on the coefficient of
variation of income and income’s linear correlation with ranks, as in
Milanovic (1997). We also use the income shares of the top, bottom,
and middle quintiles of the population. This allows us to analyze the
robustness of our results to changes in the dependent variable and to
assess the impact of labor market policies on the income of the poor.
Our choice of the set of determinants of income inequality follows
the empirical literature on income distribution (Milanovic, 2000;
Gradstein, Milanovic, and Ying, 2001; Chong, 2002; Clarke, Xu, and
Zou, 2003). We include the log of the level of GDP per capita and its
squared value. This variable is obtained from the Penn World Table
6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002). The squared specification of
the GDP per capita allows us to test for the presence of the Kuznets
curve (that is, whether income inequality rises in the early stages of
development and declines in later stages). We also consider indica-
tors of education, such as the level of secondary schooling (Barro and
Lee, 2000), and of financial depth, such as the ratio of credit to the
private sector to GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000). The
number of physicians per 1,000 people is included as a proxy for im-
provements in the health sector. Macroeconomic instability is proxied
by the consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate, and the size of the
modern sector is calculated as the share of industry and services in
the economy’s total value added.
2.2 The Methodology
Our main goal is to assess the impact of labor regulations on
income distribution by running the following regression:
According to this equation, income inequality in country i during
period t (yit) depends on a set of determinants described by the matrix
Xit, as well as on unobserved country- and period-specific effects (µ i and
ηt, respectively). Our set of long-term growth determinants follows the
work of Milanovic (2000), Gradstein, Milanovic, and Ying (2001), and
Chong (2002). The determinants of income inequality include (in logs)
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7. The variables are not all expressed in comparable units, so we need to nor-
malize them before we can aggregate them. We defined our labor market rigidity
indicator above as         , for k = 1,…, K. Next, we define             and             as the
closest and farthest a country can get to perfect competition in the labor markets.
We then define our normalized labor market rigidity indicator as
the initial level of per capita output and per capita output squared,
human capital, financial depth, health, inflation, and the size of the
modern sector (manufacturing and services).
Our income inequality regression framework also includes a set of
variables that captures the extent of regulations in the labor market, as
represented by the matrix Lit in equation (1). This matrix includes dif-
ferent indicators that focus on specific policy or institutions in the labor
market, such as minimum wages, mandatory benefits, trade union mem-
bership, government employment, social security laws, and collective
bargaining. The matrix Lit consists of a series of K labor regulations,
The larger the values of these variables, the more regulated are the
labor markets. We do not assume that labor regulations and out-
comes are time invariant, but rather expect them to change over
longer horizons.
We normalize these variables in such a way that they are equal
to one (zero) if labor markets are fully regulated (deregulated).7 If our
dependent variable is the Gini coefficient, a negative estimate for the
parameters in the Γ matrix implies that deregulating labor markets
may enhance the distribution of income.
We encounter additional problems when we attempt to run a re-
gression of equation 1, in that some variables in the Lit matrix may
be highly correlated with each other. Trade unions and public em-
ployment display the highest correlation at 0.8, while mandated ben-
efits and minimum wages have a correlation of 0.5. In this case, we
may be unable to identify the parameters of the Γ matrix. To address
this issue, we create aggregate indices of labor market regulations,
as in Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2002). We compute a simple
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described above.8 We then use the aggregate index of regulations in
the labor market,     , to test the overall effects of labor market
regulation on income inequality. We reformulate our income inequal-
ity regression in equation (1) as follows:
The nature and magnitude of the overall impact of labor market
regulations on income inequality is captured by the sign and size of
γ A. However, individual regulations may have different consequences
that cancel each other to some extent in the aggregate. One of the
shortcomings of this approach is that a significant parameter
estimate for γ A may not help identify the specific regulations that
need to be reformulated. Consequently, we still need to estimate the
individual effect of different regulations, as captured by the γ j
parameters.
If we replace the aggregate index,       , in equation (2) by one of
our individual measures of labor market regulations, the coefficient
estimate will be biased due to omitted variables. That is, the coeffi-
cient of the individual regulation will capture the effects of the labor
market rigidity, k, as well as some of the effects of all of the other
missing rigidities. Since the different rigidities are likely to be corre-
lated with each other, the value obtained for γ k might reflect the ef-
fects of these other rigidities. We can partially solve this problem by
defining complementary labor market regulations,      , as the aver-
age of the indicators that are different from k. This complementary
variable can be used to control for all other labor market features,
apart from itself, based on the following model:
where the coefficient γ k captures the effect of labor market rigidity, k,
on long-term growth.
The Estimation Strategy
We estimate our regression equation on two dimensions: cross-
section and panel data.9 Our cross-section regressions are estimated
(2) .
A
it i t it A it it yX = µ +η + β + γ + ξ "
8. In principle, we compute the average of J out of the K relevant labor
market rigidities (where J    K). Our aggregate index takes values between zero
and one, but unless all of the labor market rigidities are perfectly correlated with
each other, the actual range of variation across countries should be significantly
narrower for the aggregate measures than for any of the individual indicators.
9. Here again, we draw heavily on Calderón and Chong (in this volume).
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using least squares with robust standard errors (White, 1980). We
then use an IV estimator in which we control for the endogeneity of
labor market regulations using a set of instruments outlined by
Djankov and others (2003). We discuss the outline of the IV strategy
when we analyze the panel data techniques.
For the panel estimation of equations (2) and (3), we first use a
series of three least-squares-based estimators: the pooled OLS estima-
tor, which is the simplest regression technique given that we do not
account for either unobserved effects or endogeneity; the time-effects
estimator (that is, least squares with time dummies), through which
we can explain differences in income inequality across country stem-
ming from differences in the extent of labor market regulations; and
the within-group or country-effects estimator (that is, least squares
with country dummies), with which we analyze the movement of in-
come inequality indicators in a country to changes in its labor market
regulations. We complement these least-squares-based estimation tech-
niques with methods that control for endogenous regressors. We thus
present several estimators from the instrumental variables family.
Because it is very likely that labor regulations are partly endog-
enous, we focus our final analysis on techniques that account for the
endogeneity problems. We tackle this issue using two different strat-
egies. Our first strategy is based on IV techniques in which we select
external instruments for labor regulations. We present pooled IV es-
timates, IV with time effects, and IV with country effects. This set of
instruments follows the literature on the choice of labor regulations,
as outlined by Djankov and others (2003). According to Djankov
and associates, the choice of labor regulations across countries is ex-
plained by efficiency considerations, political power theories, and le-
gal theories.
North (1981) claims that a set of regulations is usually chosen
based on an efficiency criterion. Efficiency theory focuses on the dis-
tinction between regulation and social insurance. Some economists
argue that social insurance may be an efficient way to deal with mar-
ket failures in countries with lower social marginal cost of tax rev-
enues—in other words, in richer countries (Becker and Mulligan, 2000).
Poor countries regulate to protect workers from being mistreated by
employers, while rich countries provide unemployment insurance,
sick leave, and early retirement since they can raise taxes cheaply to
finance such operations. Efficiency theory may argue the opposite,
however. Government officials may use labor regulations to force
firms to hire and keep excess labor or to empower unions that are232 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
friendly with the government. In this case, countries with good gov-
ernance have a comparative advantage at regulation relative to other
forms of social control of business.
According to political power theories, institutions are designed to
transfer resources from those without political power to those with
power (Olson, 1993). Institutions are thus designed to be inefficient
by political leaders aiming to help themselves and their favored
groups. Political power theorists argue that regulations protecting
workers are introduced by socialist, social-democratic, and more gen-
erally leftist governments to benefit their political constituencies
(Hicks, 1999). In addition, labor regulations are a response to pres-
sure from trade unions, and the degree of regulations should be higher
when unions are more powerful. Dictatorships are less constrained
than democratically elected governments, so they will have more
redistributive laws and institutions. Constitutions, legislative con-
straints, and other forms of checks and balances are all conducive to
fewer regulations (Djankov and others, 2003). Likewise, open econo-
mies may find it expensive to introduce regulations, since competi-
tion makes it less lucrative for governments to raise firms’ regulatory
costs (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).
Finally, legal theories suggest that the legal tradition is at the root
of the way countries control economic activities (Djankov and others,
2003). Common law countries tend to rely on markets and contracts,
civil law countries on regulation, and socialist countries on state owner-
ship.10 This implies that civil law countries and socialist law countries
should regulate labor markets more extensively than common law coun-
tries. Common law countries may also have a less generous social secu-
rity system since they rely on markets to provide insurance.
10. Common law emerged in England and is mostly characterized by the impor-
tance of decisionmaking by juries, independent judges, and judicial discretion as
opposed to codes. Common law was transmitted to the British colonies, including
Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, and a number
of countries in the Caribbean, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. Civil law evolved
from Roman law in Western Europe and was incorporated into civil codes in France
and Germany in the nineteenth century. It is characterized by less independent
judiciaries, the relative unimportance of juries, and a greater role of both substan-
tive and procedural codes as opposed to judicial discretion. French civil law was
transplanted throughout Western Europe, including Belgium, Holland, Italy, Por-
tugal, and Spain, and subsequently to the colonies in North and West Africa, Latin
America, and parts in Asia. German codes became accepted in Germanic Western
Europe, but were also transplanted to Japan and from there to China, Korea, and
Taiwan. Socialist law was adopted in countries that came under the influence of the
Soviet Union, while a Scandinavian legal tradition developed in Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (Djankov and others, 2003).Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 233
Our set of instruments reflects these different theories on the
processes affecting labor regulation. To capture efficiency effects, we
use the log of GDP per capita. To test political power theories, we
analyze the significance of the index of institutionalized autocracy
from the Polity IV codebook (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003), the leftist
political orientation of the government and congress (Beck and oth-
ers, 2001), and measures of trade openness. Finally, we include dummy
variables for countries with British common law and the German
civil code to test legal theories (La Porta and others, 1999).
Our second strategy for tackling the endogeneity of labor rigidi-
ties is to use the GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This technique takes into ac-
count the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific effects.
Time effects are accounted for by the inclusion of period-specific
dummy variables, whereas country-specific effects are dealt with via
differencing, given the dynamic nature of the regression. We also
control for biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation.
A more detailed reference to the GMM-IV techniques is presented in
appendix B in Calderón and Chong (in this volume).
3. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
This section present our empirical assessment of the link between
income inequality and labor market regulation. We gather data for a
sample of 121 countries over the 1970–2000 period (see appendix A
for a list of the countries). We present some basic statistics on in-
come inequality and labor regulations, as well as the correlation analy-
sis. We then perform the regression analysis. Our assessment is
undertaken along two dimensions: a cross-section analysis over the
1970–2000 period and a panel data analysis of nonoverlapping five-
year-average observations over the same period.
3.1 Basic Statistics
Table 1 reports simple averages of income inequality and the indi-
cators of labor regulation across the world for a cross-section of coun-
tries over the 1970–2000 period. First, we find that the distribution of
income is more egalitarian among industrial nations (with an average234 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
Gini coefficient of 0.32) than among developing countries (0.41).
Income distribution in Latin America is more unequal, on average,
than among the whole set of developing countries in our sample.
Second, labor codes in industrial countries (as proxied by the L0 index
of labor market rigidity in the Rama-Artecona data set) contain more
regulations (that is, ILO standards) than developing countries. Third,
industrial countries have a higher ability to enforce regulations than
developing countries (as displayed by the L1 and L2 indices in the
Rama-Artecona data set). Latin American countries have an even
lower enforcement capability. Among the component variables in the
aggregate L1 and L2 indices (not shown in the table), the ratio of mini-
mum wages to income per capita is larger in developing economies
Table 1. Basic Statistics for Labor Market Regulation and
Income Inequality, 1970–2000a
Average across groups of countries
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Deininger and Squire (1996); Milanovic (2000); Rama and
Artecona (2002); Djankov and others (2003).
a. Based on a cross-section sample of 121 countries for the period 1970–2000. All variables are normalized. For
the mean of the different subcategories of the aggregate indices of labor institutions, see Calderon and Chong
(in this volume).
b. Indicators of income distribution are from Deininger and Squire (1996) and Milanovic (2000).
c. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
d. Indicators of labor regulations are from Djankov and others (2003).
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than in industrial countries, while social security contributions as a
percentage of workers’ salaries, trade union membership, and public
sector employment (proxied by employment in the central or general
government) are larger in industrial countries than in developing
nations.
Finally, using the Djankov-La Porta data set of labor regulations,
we find that labor codes in developing countries contain more regula-
tions regarding employment laws and industrial (collective) relations
laws than do labor codes in industrial countries. Latin American coun-
tries, in particular, appear to have a high degree of regulations. On
the other hand, labor codes in industrial countries contain more ben-
efits in their social security laws. Further analysis of the components
of the different aggregate indices of laws protecting workers (not
shown in the table) indicates that regulations on the conditions of
employment are significantly larger among developing nations than
among industrial countries; industrial countries have more regula-
tions regarding the participation of workers in management than
developing countries, although the latter group has more regulations
on collective bargaining and collective disputes; and workers in in-
dustrial countries are more protected than those in developing coun-
tries in terms of the benefits stipulated in their social security laws,
especially in the area of unemployment benefits.
In table 2, we present the evolution of the sample averages by
decade over the 1970–2000 period. Our panel statistics are reported for
all of countries, and for the sample of developing, Latin American coun-
tries and Chile. We find that income inequality decreased over the
period regardless of the sample of countries evaluated. Gini coefficients
decreased (from 0.40 in the 1970s to 0.38 in the 1990s), the income
shares of the top quintiles decreased, and the income shares of middle
and bottom quintiles increased. Second, labor codes incorporated more
ILO standards over time. Specifically, the L0 index increased from
0.27 in the 1970s to 0.32 in the 1990s for the full sample of countries.
Third, the enforcement of labor regulations also increased, on aver-
age, over time for the full sample of countries (whether we use the
aggregate L1 or L2 index). Finally, a closer look into the components
of the aggregate L1 and L2 indexes (not shown in the table) yields the
following result: the increase in the aggregate L1 and L2 indices among
developing nations is explained by upward trends in minimum wages
and social security contributions.All countries Developing countries Latin America Chile
Variable 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Income distribution
Gini coefficient (0–1)







De jure index L0
De facto index L1
De facto index L2
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0












Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Deininger and Squire (1996); Milanovic (2000); and Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. Based on panel data of a sample of 121 countries for the period 1970–2000, in nonoverlapping five-year-average observations. All variables are normalized. For the mean of
the different subcategories of the aggregate indices of labor institutions, see Calderon and Chong (in this volume). Indicators of income distribution are from Deininger and
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3.2 Correlation Analysis
Table 3 presents the cross-section correlation analysis of income
inequality and labor regulation indicators for the full sample of coun-
tries and for developing countries.11 For the sake of robustness, we
use not only different sets of labor market rigidity indicators, but also
different measures of income inequality (namely, Gini coefficients and
income shares). We first present the cross-section correlation between
inequality and the labor market rigidity indicators in the Rama-Artecona
data set. In general, we find that de jure labor regulation (as proxied
by the L0 index) and de facto labor regulation (as proxied by the aggre-
gate L1 and L2 indices) have a negative association with the Gini coef-
ficient for the full sample of countries. All three labor regulation indices
have a negative correlation with the income shares of the top quintiles
of the population and a positive association with the income shares of
the middle and bottom quintiles (see table 3). In particular, the aggre-
gate L1 index of de facto rigidities has a larger negative correlation
with the Gini coefficient than the L2 index (–0.46 versus –0.12).
A further look in the correlation between income inequality (as
proxied by the Gini coefficient) and the aggregate indices of labor
regulation yields two important results. First, minimum wages and
trade union membership in the L1 index display the largest correla-
tion with the Gini coefficient (approximately –0.5). Second, trade union
membership and public sector employment in the L2 index exhibit
the largest negative association with the Gini coefficient (with a cor-
relation coefficient of approximately –0.1). This preliminary evidence
suggests that the countries with greater labor regulations (indepen-
dently of whether they are de jure or de facto) tend to display lower
levels of income inequality.
Table 3 also presents the cross-section correlation between in-
come inequality and the labor regulation indicators in the Djankov–
La Porta data set. We find that the aggregate index of employment
laws (as well as the different subindices) are positively correlated with
the Gini coefficient, with the largest positive correlation displayed by
regulations on job security. We also find a negative association be-
tween the index of industrial relations laws and the Gini coefficient
that is mainly driven by worker participation in management.
11. For reasons of space, we comment only on the results for the full sample
of countries. Where necessary, we point out some differences in the correlation
analysis between industrial and developing countries.Full sample of countries Developing countries
Income quintile Income quintile
Gini Top Bottom Gini Top Bottom
Variable  coeff. Top two Middle  two Bottom coeff. Top two Middle  two Bottom
Labor market rigidityb
De jure index L0





   employment
De facto index L2
Minimum waged
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO
   convention 87
Central government
   employment
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–0.14Full sample of countries Developing countries
Income quintile Income quintile
Gini Top Bottom Gini Top Bottom









   and death benefits
Sickness and health benefits
Unemployment benefits
Table 3. (continued)
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003).
a. Based on a cross-section sample of 121 countries for the 1970–2000 period. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the paper.
b. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
c. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
d. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.
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The other two components of the aggregate industrial relations in-
dex (namely, collective bargaining and collective disputes) exhibit a
positive correlation with income inequality. Finally, we find a nega-
tive association between social security laws and the Gini coefficient;
this is the largest negative coefficient among the aggregate indices,
at –0.38. Of the different benefits covered by social security laws,
unemployment benefits display the largest negative correlation with
the Gini coefficient (–0,47), while sickness and health benefits display
the smallest correlation (–0.17). In summary, countries with more
egalitarian distribution usually offer a better social security environ-
ment (with a legal framework that entails more benefits on old age,
sickness, and unemployment than in other countries).
Table 4 reports the panel data correlation analysis between the
Gini coefficient and the different indicators of labor market regula-
tions from the Rama-Artecona database. We find that most of our
indicators (both aggregate indices and individual categories) have an
unconditional negative correlation with income inequality. The cor-
relation coefficient between L0 and the Gini coefficient is –0.32, while
the correlation between L1 and income inequality is higher than be-
tween L2 and income inequality (–0.47 and –0.20, respectively).12
The table also shows the evolution of the correlation between these
variables over decades. The correlation between income inequality and
de jure labor regulations (the L0 index) is negative in all decades, al-
though it decreases from –0.34 in the 1970s to –0.30 in the 1990s. In the
case of de facto regulations (as proxied by the aggregate L1 and L2 indi-
ces), the correlations decreased in the 1980s relative to the 1970s, but
they then increased in the 1990s (although very slightly for L1). Finally,
regulations on minimum wages (whether normalized by industrial wages
or per capita income) are positively associated with income inequality
for industrial countries (not shown in the table). For developing coun-
tries, we find a positive correlation only for minimum wages normalized
by per capita income. Of course, we need to control for other determi-
nants of inequality and possible reverse causation before we can prop-
erly conclude whether labor regulations affect inequality.
12. The largest negative correlation among the categories of the aggregate L1
index is with trade union membership (–0.50), followed by general government
employment (–0.36) and social security contribution (–0.30). The smallest correla-
tion is exhibited by minimum wages (–0.10). Days of maternity leave and trade
union membership (as proxied by the ratification of ILO convention 87) show a
negative correlation with the Gini coefficient among the L2 components (–0.31
and –0.18, respectively), while minimum wages and central government employ-
ment display a positive correlation (0.16 and 0.03, respectively).Full sample of countries Developing countries
Labor rigidity indicator 1970-2000 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970-2000 1970s 1980s 1990s
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Table 4. Panel Data Correlation Analysis for Labor Market Regulation and Income Inequality
(Gini coefficient), 1970–2000a
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. Based on a panel data sample of 121 countries for the 1970–2000 period, in five-year nonoverlapping observations. The income inequality indicator is the Gini coefficient
(0–1); indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.








































































































–0.13242 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
3.3 Cross-section Regression Analysis
We first analyze the impact of labor regulations on income inequality
for our cross-section of 121 countries over the 1970–2000 period. We
start with our cross-section OLS estimates and then instrument for
labor regulation in our simple IV estimates, where our dependent vari-
able is the Gini coefficient. Table 5 presents the OLS and IV estimates
including the three indicators of labor market regulations at the same
time, both for the full sample and developing countries.13 In this table,
we report the coefficients, their standard errors and the R squared.14
Tables B1 and B2 in appendix B present a similar exercise, but includ-
ing only one labor market indicator at a time.
De jure regulations (the L0 index) do not seem to have a signifi-
cant relationship with income inequality, regardless of the sample
and estimation technique used. The L1 index of de facto regulations
has a negative coefficient that is significant only for the OLS regres-
sion for developing countries. The L2 index has no significant associa-
tion to the Gini coefficient. Using our IV estimates, we find that the
following variables have a robust negative impact on the Gini coeffi-
cient across samples: the share of unionized labor, the share of gen-
eral government employment, and the ratio of minimum wages to
per capita income. Based on their estimated coefficients in table 5,
we infer that a one-standard-deviation increase in trade union mem-
bership and public employment would reduce the Gini coefficient
(0–1) by 0.094 and 0.082, respectively, while an analogous increase in
the ratio of minimum wages to per capita income would increase
income inequality by 0.15 over the thirty-year period. Finally, im-
proving the ratio between L1 and L0, which serves as a measure of
compliance, significantly improves income inequality in both samples.
13. Following the strategy applied by Calderón and Chong (in this volume),
we base our choice of instruments for the labor market rigidity indicators on the
literature summarized in Djankov and others (2003). Our main findings are that
labor markets are more regulated in wealthy countries and in countries with a
left-oriented government, while they are less regulated in countries with com-
mon law (British legal tradition). In addition, wealthy countries, more open coun-
tries, and countries with a British legal tradition have fewer labor regulations
(proxied by employment laws, industrial relations laws, and social security laws).
For the sake of brevity, we do not report the first-stage regression results; they
are available on request.
14. The income inequality regression includes the following explanatory vari-
ables: output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling,
liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, number of physicians per
1,000 people, and the different indicators of labor regulation. A full report of the
regression results is available on request.Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 243
Table 5 also reports our results for the Djankov–La Porta indica-
tors of labor regulations. We find that the aggregate index of employ-
ment laws has a positive and significant relationship with the Gini
coefficient, regardless of the sample and estimation technique used.
This positive relationship is mainly explained by regulations on alter-
native employment contracts. Industrial relations laws have a positive
association with inequality, although it is only significant when we use
IV. This effect on inequality is attributed to regulations on collective
bargaining and collective disputes. Finally, social security laws also have
a positive relation with inequality, which is significant only in the OLS
estimations and is mainly attributed to the significance of regulations
on sickness and health benefits. Economically speaking, a one-stan-
dard-deviation increase in the aggregate index of employment laws and
industrial relations laws would increase the Gini coefficient by 0.02 over
the thirty-year period (that is, the coefficient moves from an average of
0.39 for the full sample of countries to 0.37). An analogous increase in
the regulations of both collective bargaining and disputes has a stron-
ger negative impact on the distribution of income: the Gini coefficient
increases by 0.04 and 0.10, respectively, over the thirty-year period.
3.4 Panel Data Regression Analysis
After performing our cross-section regression analysis, we evalu-
ate the relation between labor market regulations and income inequality
using a panel data set of nonoverlapping five-year observations for the
1970–2000 period. We take advantage of the additional dimension (that
is, the time dimension) to draw some inferences on the impact of labor
market regulations on income inequality with robust panel data esti-
mation techniques.
Simple Techniques
We start by characterizing the relation between labor market regu-
lations and income inequality using simpler techniques
such as pooled OLS and OLS with time and country fixed effects. The
pooled OLS does not take into account unobserved specific effects and
endogeneity of the regressors. While the first problem can be accounted
for by using time and country fixed effects, the second one is solved by
including instrumental variables. We report estimates using IV with
and without time and country fixed effects. In the next subsection, weFull sample of countries Developing countries
Least squares Instrumental variables Least squares Instrumental variables
Std. Std. Std. Std.
Variable Coefficient  dev. R2 Coefficient  dev. R2 Coefficient  dev. R2 Coefficient  dev. R2
Labor market rigidityb
De jure index L0
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De facto index L2
Minimum waged
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L1 relative to L0
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Table 5. Cross-country Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulation and Income Inequalitya
(Dependent variable: Gini coefficient)Full sample of countries Developing countries
Least squares Instrumental variables Least squares Instrumental variables
Std. Std. Std. Std.
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* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations 2 and 3 in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our
control variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000
people, and the labor regulation indicator. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables,
leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based on the
existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression results and
standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, but they are available from the authors on request.
b. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
c. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
d. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.
e. Indicators of labor regulations are from Djankov and others (2003).246 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
present estimates using the GMM-IV system estimator developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which takes
unobserved effects and endogeneity into account using both internal
and exogenous instruments for the labor regulation indicators. Since
the latter method is our preferred estimation technique, we empha-
size these estimates in our discussion of the results.
Tables 6 and 7 report the panel data estimation results for
pooled and time effects, using both OLS and IV country techniques,
respectively.
We focus our discussion on the IV estimates since, in principle,
they tackle the endogeneity problem (see table 7). We find that de
jure labor regulations have no significant relation with income in-
equality in almost all cases. However, L0 has a negative and signifi-
cant impact on inequality for the world sample using our country-effects
estimator. The L1 index has a negative and significant impact on
inequality in developing countries when using country-effects estima-
tor, while the L2 index has no significant impact on income distribu-
tion regardless of the sample. If we look at the components of
the L1 index, the share of unionized labor and the size of public em-
ployment seem to drive down inequality among developing countries.
When we analyze the components of the L2 index, we find that ma-
ternity leave and public employment have a negative and significant
effect on the Gini coefficient in developing countries.
Our extensive regression analysis using OLS and IV estimates
(pooled and with time and country fixed effects) of income inequality
and aggregate de jure and de facto labor regulations indices (L0, L1,
and L2) is presented in tables B3 through B8 in appendix B. Our speci-
fication includes other explanatory variables such as per capita out-
put (in logs), per capita output squared, secondary schooling, liquid
liabilities (as a percentage to GDP), the number of physicians
per 1,000 people, the CPI inflation rate, and the size of the modern
sector.15
15. In general, we find a nonlinear relation between income inequality and
output per capita that is consistent with the Kuznets curve hypothesis (an in-
verted-U-shaped curve for the Gini coefficient). We also find that countries with
a relatively more equal income distribution also have a greater stock of human
capital, deeper financial systems, better health systems, lower macroeconomic
instability, and a larger agricultural sector than do countries in which the income
distribution is more skewed (see tables B3 through B8 in appendix B for further
detail).Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 247
The GMM-IV System Estimator
The previous section used simple panel data techniques to char-
acterize the relation between income inequality and labor market
regulations. In this section, we introduce the GMM-IV system esti-
mator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). The GMM-IV system estimator is our preferred estimator for
two main reasons. First, it accounts for unobserved country-specific
effects that may bias our estimates. Specifically, we incorporate time
dummies to control for the presence of time effects, and we take care
of the country-specific effects by expressing our equation in differ-
ences. Second, the estimator controls for the possibility of endog-
enous regressors. We use both internal instruments (that is, lagged
levels as instruments for the differences and lagged differences as
instruments for the levels) and exogenous instruments for labor regu-
lations suggested by theory (namely, legal and institutional variables).
To confirm the validity of our income inequality regressions, we com-
pute the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the
validity of the moment conditions that we set up to perform the IV
regressions, and tests of higher-order serial correlation.16 These speci-
fication tests validate our regressions for statistical inference: our
instruments are valid according to the Sargan test, and we reject the
possibility of our errors displaying high-order serial correlation.
Before we discuss our results on the variable of interest (namely,
labor market regulations), we briefly comment on the coefficient
estimates for the other explanatory variables. First, we find evidence
in favor of the Kuznets hypothesis that income inequality increases
in the early stages of development and then decreases in later
stages. On average, the turning point for GDP (in logs) in the full
sample of countries is 8.1 (approximately the initial level of GDP per
capita in Morocco during the 1996–2000 period), whereas the mean
in the regression sample is 8.6 (Colombia during the same period).
Second, a larger stock of human capital (as proxied by a larger enroll-
ment rate in secondary education or a larger number of physicians per
1,000 people) may help reduce income inequality. Deeper financial
systems also drive inequality down. Income inequality increases if the
country features high inflation or a large modern sector, although the
16. By construction, our error term displays first-order serial correlation. For
more technical details on the estimation technique, see Calderón y Chong (in this
volume).Estimation method and Full sample Developing countries
labor regulation indicator Coefficient Std. dev. R2 Coefficient Std. dev. R2
Pooled estimator
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Time-effects estimator
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De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
Table 6. Panel Data Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality:
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* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1).
Our control variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per
1,000 people, and the labor regulation indicator. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic
variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based
on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression results
and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, but they are available from the authors on request.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.Estimation method and Full sample Developing countries
labor regulation indicator Coefficient Std. dev. R2 Coefficient Std. dev. R2
Pooled estimator
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Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
Table 7. Panel Data Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality:
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labor regulation indicator Coefficient Std. dev. R2 Coefficient Std. dev. R2
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* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations 2 and 3 in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our
control variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000
people, and the labor regulation indicator. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables,
leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based on the
existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression results and
standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, but they are available from the authors on request.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
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Table 8. GMM-IV Panel Data Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulations and Income
Inequality: GMM-IV
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8.16Full sample of countries Developing countries
Explanatory variable L0 L1 L2 L0 L1 L2








* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). The estimation method is the GMM-IV system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995), based on a panel data set of 121
countries over the 1970–2000 period, with nonoverlapping five-year observations. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity
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coefficient estimate of inflation is not robust (see table 8 for additional
details).
We now turn to the effect of labor market regulations on income
inequality. First, we find that de jure regulations, as proxied by the
L0 index, have a positive and significant impact on the Gini coeffi-
cient for both the full sample of countries and the sample of develop-
ing countries. Hence, income inequality worsens with the adoption of
an increasing number of ILO standards. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the L0 index (namely, 0.21 for the full sample of coun-
tries) would reduce the Gini coefficient by 0.01, while an analogous
increase in the L0 index for developing countries (that is, 0.18) would
raise the Gini coefficient by 0.025. This increase in the L0 index (again,
0.21 for the full sample of countries) is much larger than the average
increase observed from 1976–80 to 1996–2000 (0.06). Only Brazil, Fin-
land, Spain, and Uruguay experienced such a large change over that
period (that is, an increase of approximately 0.21 in the normalized
number of ILO standards between 1976–80 and 1996–2000). We should
take this result with caution, however, since reducing the number of
regulations contained in the labor codes does not necessarily enhance
the enforcement abilities of the regulators.
In contrast with our results for de jure regulations, we find that
both the L1 and L2 indices of labor de facto regulations have a nega-
tive and significant coefficient estimate for the full sample of coun-
tries and the sample of developing countries. Labor market regulations
should thus reduce income inequality in countries with a solid capa-
bility to enforce the law. A one-standard-deviation increase in the L1
index (or 0.13) may reduce income inequality by 0.037, while an analo-
gous increase in the L2 index (or 0.15) may reduce the Gini coefficient
by 0.033. An analogous increase in the extent of de facto regulations
would cause a decline in the Gini coefficient between 0.028 (when L1
declines) and 0.032 (when L2 declines).17
Tables 9 and 10 report—for the full sample and the sample of
developing countries, respectively—the sensitivity analysis of our co-
efficient estimates of labor regulations to changes in the indicator of
labor regulation used in the regression (here we use the different
17. From 1976–80 to 1996–2000, the L1 index increased more than one stan-
dard deviation in Bangladesh, Jordan, and South Africa, whereas it decreased one
standard deviation or more in Australia, Bulgaria, Israel, Syria, and the United
Kingdom. The L2 index increased at least one standard deviation in Bangladesh,
Romania, Turkey, and Venezuela, while it decreased one standard deviation or
more in Bahrain, Niger, and New Zealand.Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 255
components of the aggregate indices used in table 8) and to changes
in the proxy of income inequality used as our dependent variable. In
addition to the Gini coefficient, we use the income share of selected
quintiles of the population.
We first analyze the impact of the different individual measures of
labor market regulations on the Gini coefficient. The negative impact of
the L1 index on income inequality for the full sample of countries is
mainly attributed to a negative and significant impact of social security
contributions, trade union membership, and government employment.
A one-standard-deviation increase in social security contributions re-
duces the Gini coefficient by 0.008, whereas analogous increases in trade
union membership and public employment generate a decline in the
Gini coefficient of 0.028 and 0.01, respectively. In the case of the nega-
tive impact of the L2 index, we find negative and significant effects on
income inequality from maternity leave and trade union membership
(as proxied by the ratification of the ILO convention on organized labor).
A one-standard-deviation increase in mandated benefits (as proxied by a
one-standard-deviation increase in the days of maternity leave) may re-
duce the Gini coefficient by 0.01. When we restrict our regression analy-
sis to developing countries, mandated benefits—that is, social security
contributions—drive the redistributive impact of the L1 index, whereas
maternity leave and trade union membership drive the redistributive
effects of the L2 index. The impact of a one-standard-deviation increase
in mandated benefits among developing nations generates a reduction
in the Gini coefficient of 0.012 regardless of the proxy used.
Next we analyze the impact of the different aggregate indices on
the incomes share of the top, middle, and bottom quintiles of the
population. Our index of de jure regulations, L0, has a positive but
insignificant impact on the income shares of the top quintiles, but it
has a negative and significant impact on the income share of the
middle class (as proxied by the income share of the middle quintile)
and the poor (as proxied by the share of the bottom quintile). A one-
standard-deviation increase in the (normalized) number of ILO stan-
dards ratified would reduce the income share of the middle and bottom
quintiles by 0.005 and 0.003, respectively. For the sample of develop-
ing countries, de jure regulations have a positive and significant rela-
tion with the income share of the top two quintiles and a negative
and significant relationship with the middle and bottom quintiles.
A one-standard-deviation increase in the L0 index raises the income
share of the top two quintiles by 0.03, and it reduces the income share
of the middle and bottom quintiles by 0.015 and 0.008, respectively.Population quintile
Bottom two
Gini Top quintile Top two quintiles Middle quintile quintiles Bottom quintile
Labor market rigidity indicator Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 No. obs.
De jure index L0
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Table 9. GMM-IV Panel Regressions for Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality:



















































































































































































































Gini Top quintile Top two quintiles Middle quintile quintiles Bottom quintile
Labor market rigidity indicator Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 No. obs.
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0








































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). The estimation method is the GMM-IV system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995), based on a panel data set of 121
countries over the 1970–2000 period, with nonoverlapping five-year observations. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002). Asymptotic standard
errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.Population quintile
Bottom two
Gini Top quintile Top two quintiles Middle quintile quintiles Bottom quintile
Labor market rigidity indicator Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 No. obs.
De jure index L0





   employment
De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO
   convention 87
Central government
   employment
Table 10. GMM-IV Panel Regressions for Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality:



















































































































































































































Gini Top quintile Top two quintiles Middle quintile quintiles Bottom quintile
Labor market rigidity indicator Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 Coeff. R2 No. obs.
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0








































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). The estimation method is the GMM-IV system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995), based on a panel data set of 121
countries over the 1970–2000 period, with nonoverlapping five-year observations. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002). Asymptotic standard
errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.260 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
The L1 index has a negative and significant impact on the top
shares and a positive and significant effect on the middle and bottom
shares. Social security contribution is the dimension that reduces
the income share of the top quintiles and increases the income share
of the middle quintile. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase
in the social security contributions (0.22) may help reduce the in-
come share of the top quintiles by around 0.01, increase marginally
the income share of the middle quintile by 0.003, and increase the
income share of the bottom quintiles between 0.008 and 0.004. Active
labor policies that raise public employment also work as an effective
tool in raising the income share of the bottom quintiles of the popula-
tion (although the economic impact is negligible). When we analyze
the sample of developing countries, we find that the redistributive
impact of L1 across income shares is mainly attributed to mandated
benefits (as proxied by the social security contributions as a percent-
age of salaries). The redistributive effects of increased social security
contributions are larger for the full sample of countries: a one-stan-
dard-deviation increase in social security contributions would reduce
the shares of the top quintiles by 0.018 to 0.02, increase the middle
quintile by 0.01, and raise the income share of the bottom quintiles
by 0.004 to 0.011.
In addition, an increase in labor market regulations—approximated
by a rise in the L2 index—would reduce the income shares of the top
quintiles of the population and increase the income shares of the bot-
tom quintiles. Its impact on the income share of the middle quintile is
statistically negligible. The redistributive effects across income shares
are basically attributed to mandated benefits (as proxied by the num-
ber of days of maternity leave). A one-standard-deviation increase in
mandated benefits (that is, in maternity leave) would reduce the shares
of the top quintiles by between 0.013 and 0.0171, increase the middle
quintile by 0.004, and raise the income share of the bottom quintiles by
between 0.005 and 0.01. The number of days of maternity leave (our
proxy for mandated benefits) drives the redistributive effects of the L2
index in developing nations, which is consistent with our findings for
the L1 index. The quantitative effects of increasing mandated benefits
are similar to those found for the full sample of countries.
Finally, an increase in our measures of compliance (as proxied by
a reduction in the gap between de jure and de facto regulations) sig-
nificantly improves income inequality. This proposition holds for the
full sample of countries when the gap is measured with the L1 index
and for the sample of developing countries regardless of the measureLabor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 261
of de facto regulations used. If the compliance in the extent of regula-
tions in the labor markets improves (as proxied by a decrease in the
gap between the L0 and L1 indices), the Gini coefficient would de-
crease by 0.03 (when using the full sample regressions) to 0.05 (when
using the developing country regressions).
3.5 A Scorecard on the Redistributive Benefits of
Labor Regulations
In similar fashion to Calderón and Chong (in this volume), we con-
struct a scorecard to evaluate the redistributive benefits of labor market
regulations for the full sample of countries and for the sample of develop-
ing countries. The scorecard assesses the relation between our indica-
tors of labor regulations and inequality measures such as the Gini
coefficient and the income shares of the top, middle and bottom 20 per-
cent of the population. We summarize the information from our differ-
ent panel estimations by inputting the value of –1 for a negative and
significant coefficient estimate, +1 for a positive and significant coeffi-
cient estimate, and 0 for an insignificant coefficient. The proportion of
these negative and positive coefficients is presented in table 11. Our dis-
cussion of the summary results centers on the full sample of countries.
Regarding the relation between labor regulations and the Gini
coefficient, we find, first, that de jure regulations have a positive, but
weak correlation with income inequality. Second, de facto regula-
tions—measured by either the L1 or L2 aggregate index—have a nega-
tive association with income inequality. The robust relation between
the L1 index and the Gini coefficient may be attributed to the redis-
tributive effects of both trade union membership and public employ-
ment. Mandated benefits (as proxied by the number of days of
maternity leave) seem to explain the robust relation between the L2
index and the Gini coefficient. Finally, our two measures of enforce-
ment of labor regulations seem to have a negative and robust rela-
tion with the Gini coefficient.
The aggregate L1 index of de facto labor regulations is negatively
associated with the income share of the top 20 percent of the popula-
tion and positively associated with the income shares of bottom and
middle quintiles. The negative relation between the L1 index and the
income share of the top quintile may be explained by the robust nega-
tive relation with trade union membership and public employment.
The positive correlation between the L1 index and the income share
of the bottom quintile may be explained by social security contribu-














Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. Based on five different panel data, we input the value of –1 for a negative and significant coefficient estimate, +1 for a positive and significant coefficient estimate, and 0
for insignificant coefficients; the table reports the proportion of significant negative and positive coefficients.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.




























































































              Full sample of countries Developing countries
Quintile Quintile
Labor rigidity indicator Gini Top Middle Bottom Gini Top Middle Bottom
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimun wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 263
has a robust negative relation with the income share of the top quintile
of the population and a positive, but weak association with the in-
come share of both the middle and bottom quintiles. The negative
robust association with the income share of the top quintile may be
attributed to mandated benefits (proxied by maternity leave rights)
and trade union membership.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the relationship between labor regulations and
income inequality. Finding robust results is not a straightforward
process, however, because there are alternative ways of measuring
regulations and alternative estimation techniques for addressing (al-
beit imperfectly) simultaneity and probable measurement errors. We
thus used alternative econometric approaches and considered two
data sets and two alternative samples. A number of results appear to
be fairly robust.
The main results in our paper can be grouped in three types. First,
we find that de jure regulations do not improve income distribution.
The Rama-Artecona indicator (the L0 index) does not display any con-
sistent pattern, and the Djankov-La Porta indicators either have no
effect or worsen income distribution. Second, relative compliance with
existing regulations, particularly the ratio between the L1 and L0 indi-
ces of the Rama-Artecona data set, seems to improve income distribu-
tion, although we cannot rule out the possibility that this measure is
proxying for other factors such as institutional development. Third, de
facto regulations are weakly associated, overall, with improving income
inequality. This result is partly due to the fact that different regulations
have quite distinct effects. In particular, we find that a higher mini-
mum wage tends to worsen income distribution, whereas the extent of
trade union membership, the importance of government employment
and maternity leave improve it. Finally, some of these positive results do
not carry through to the bottom quintile of the population.264 César Calderón, Alberto Chong, and Rodrigo Valdés
APPENDIX A
List of Countries
— Industrial countries (twenty-two countries): Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States.
— Latin America and the Caribbean (twenty-one countries): Argen-
tina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
— East Asia and the Pacific (twelve countries): China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
— Eastern Europe and Central Asia (seventeen countries): Belarus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia.
— Middle East and North Africa (twenty-one countries): Algeria,
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
— South Asia (five countries): Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka.
— Sub-Saharan Africa (twenty-three countries): Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.Labor Market Regulations and Income Inequality 265
APPENDIX B
Supplemental Tables
In addition to the exercises reported in this appendix, we performed
cross-country regression analysis between income inequality and labor
market regulations using income shares as a proxy for our dependent
variable, for both the Rama-Artecona and Djankov-La Porta databases.
We also carried out sensitivity analyses on panel regressions for differ-
ent measures of labor regulations for the full sample of countries and
the sample of developing countries, using OLS and IV with pooled and
time-effects estimators. These results are available on request.Full sample Developing countries Full sample Developing countries
Explanatory variable L0  L1 L2 L0  L1 L2 EL0 IR0 SS0 EL0  IR0 SS0
Constant
Output per capita (in logs)






Physicians per 1,000 people






















   (0.85)
0.118**
   (0.06)
–0.007**
   (0.00)
–0.911*
   (0.60)
–0.020*
   (0.01)
–0.023
   (0.03)
0.076**
   (0.04)
0.274*
   (0.15)
–4.222**
   (1.55)
–0.123*
   (0.07)
0.354
   (0.94)
0.119**
   (0.05)
–0.007**
   (0.00)
–1.016*
   (0.62)
–0.021*
   (0.01)
–0.019
   (0.02)
0.080**
   (0.04)
0.295*
   (0.16)
–5.461**
   (2.00)
0.026
   (0.08)
0.763
   (1.08)
0.143**
   (0.07)
–0.009**
   (0.00)
–0.766*
   (0.47)
–0.028*
   (0.02)
–0.007
   (0.04)
0.069*
   (0.04)
0.285*
   (0.16)
–6.550**
   (2.68)
0.084
   (0.10)
–0.375
   (1.05)
0.175**
   (0.07)
–0.010**
   (0.00)
–0.771*
   (0.48)
–0.034*
   (0.02)
–0.013
   (0.04)
0.072*
   (0.04)
0.279*
   (0.16)
–5.486**
   (2.43)
–0.215*
   (0.11)
0.700
   (1.16)
0.148**
   (0.06)
–0.009**
   (0.00)
–0.779*
   (0.48)
–0.027*
   (0.01)
–0.010
   (0.04)
0.085**
   (0.04)
0.289*
   (0.16)
–5.887**
   (2.53)
0.047






















   (1.05)
0.056**
   (0.03)
–0.003**
   (0.00)
–1.694**
   (0.83)
–0.020*
   (0.01)
–0.013
   (0.03)
0.064*
   (0.03)
0.299*
   (0.19)
–6.569**
   (1.91)
0.022






















   (1.23)
0.110**
   (0.03)
–0.008**
   (0.00)
–0.911**
   (0.45)
–0.018
   (0.04)
0.033
   (0.04)
0.049*
   (0.03)
0.261
   (0.18)
–7.704**
   (2.40)
0.084**
   (0.03)
0.866
   (1.25)
0.170**
   (0.03)
–0.011**
   (0.00)
–0.804**
   (0.39)
–0.035
   (0.04)
0.001
   (0.05)
0.058*
   (0.03)
0.312*
   (0.19)
–6.712**
   (2.49)
0.031
   (0.03)
0.373
   (1.02)
0.163**
   (0.03)
–0.010**
   (0.00)
–1.482**
   (0.71)
–0.047
   (0.04)
0.010
   (0.04)
0.088**
   (0.04)
0.216
   (0.17)
–9.537**
   (2.50)
0.058**
   (0.03)
Table B1. Cross-section Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulations and Income
Inequality: Ordinary Least Squaresa  (Dependent variable: Gini coefficient)Full sample Developing countries Full sample Developing countries










































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003).
a. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). The L0, L1, and L2 indices are the Rama-Artecona aggregate de jure and de facto labor rigidity indices. The EL0, IR0,
and SS0 indices are the Djankov-La Porta aggregate indices of employment laws, industrial relations laws, and social security laws, respectively. Standard errors are in
parentheses.Full sample Developing countries Full sample Developing countries
Explanatory variable L0  L1 L2 L0  L1 L2 EL0 IR0 SS0 EL0  IR0 SS0
Constant
Output per capita (in logs)






Physicians per 1,000 people






























































   (1.08)
0.049*






   (0.02)
–0.030
   (0.06)
0.077**
   (0.04)
0.304*
   (0.16)
–5.675**
   (2.56)
0.047






















   (1.18)
0.063*
   (0.03)
–0.003**
   (0.00)
–0.719**
   (0.09)
–0.024*
   (0.01)
–0.030
   (0.06)
0.078**
   (0.04)
0.305*
   (0.16)
–6.428**
   (2.76)
0.258
   (0.36)
0.372
   (1.08)
0.068**
   (0.03)
–0.004*
   (0.00)
–1.159**
   (0.09)
–0.012*
   (0.01)
–0.002
   (0.03)
0.060
   (0.04)
0.275*
   (0.18)
–7.813**
   (2.14)
0.092*
   (0.05)
0.402
   (1.08)
0.052**
   (0.02)
–0.003*
   (0.00)
–1.188**
   (0.09)
–0.017*
   (0.01)
–0.013
   (0.03)
0.045
   (0.04)
0.302*
   (0.18)
–7.463**
   (2.11)
0.058*
   (0.03)
0.354
   (1.06)
0.060**
   (0.03)
–0.004*
   (0.00)
–1.096**
   (0.09)
–0.018*
   (0.01)
–0.010
   (0.03)
0.058
   (0.04)
0.276*
   (0.18)
–6.840**
   (2.22)
0.062





























































Table B2. Cross-section Regression Analysis for Labor Regulation and Income Inequality:
Instrumental Variablesa (Dependent variable: Gini coefficient)Full sample Developing countries Full sample Developing countries










































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov, and others (2003).
a. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). The L0, L1, and L2 indices are the Rama-Artecona aggregate de jure and de facto labor rigidity indices. The EL0, IR0,
and SS0 indices are the Djankov-La Porta aggregate indices of employment laws, industrial relations laws, and social security laws, respectively. Our set of instruments for
the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin,
German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; the set of instruments was chosen from the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors
are in parentheses.Full sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector






Table B3. The Impact of De Jure Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis with Least Squaresa
(Dependent variable: Gini coefficient)
0.180**
     (0.08)
–0.011**
     (0.00)
–0.229
     (0.16)
–0.021**
     (0.01)
–0.040**
     (0.02)
–3.773**
     (0.84)
0.022
     (0.02)
0.294**
     (0.06)
0.022





* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our control
variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000 people, and the labor
regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic
variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based on the existing
literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression results and
standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, but they are available from the authors on request.
0.181**
     (0.09)
–0.010**
     (0.01)
–0.164
     (0.15)
–0.027**
     (0.01)
–0.050**
     (0.02)
–4.521**
     (0.90)
0.026*
     (0.02)
0.257**
     (0.07)
0.024






     (0.12)
–0.004
     (0.01)
0.135
     (0.10)
–0.018**
     (0.01)
0.026
     (0.02)
1.260*
     (0.76)
–0.011
     (0.01)
–0.088
     (0.08)
–0.110*






     (0.10)
–0.012*
     (0.01)
–0.143
     (0.17)
–0.027**
     (0.01)
–0.047**
     (0.02)
–5.565**
     (1.02)
0.022
     (0.02)
0.294**
     (0.06)
0.067*






     (0.11)
–0.014**
     (0.01)
–0.060
     (0.17)
–0.039**
     (0.01)
–0.048**
     (0.02)
–6.157**
     (1.12)
0.034*
     (0.02)
0.263**
     (0.07)
0.055






     (0.15)
–0.008
     (0.01)
0.172
     (0.13)
–0.031**
     (0.01)
0.026
     (0.03)
2.331*
     (1.29)
–0.013
     (0.01)
–0.075
     (0.09)
–0.154*




8.46Full sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector







     (0.08)
–0.014**
     (0.00)
–0.338**
     (0.17)
–0.019**
     (0.01)
–0.048**
     (0.02)
–3.117**
     (0.82)
0.018
     (0.02)
0.303**
     (0.06)
0.033





* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1).
Our control variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per
1,000 people, and the labor regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant.  Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development,
trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy;
this set of instruments was chosen based on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space,
but they are available from the authors on request.
0.214**
     (0.09)
–0.013**
     (0.01)
–0.282*
     (0.16)
–0.025**
     (0.01)
–0.056**
     (0.02)
–3.785**
     (0.85)
0.022
     (0.02)
0.268**
     (0.07)
0.015






     (0.14)
–0.007
     (0.01)
0.116
     (0.11)
–0.020**
     (0.01)
0.025
     (0.02)
0.741
     (0.72)
–0.010
     (0.01)
–0.090
     (0.08)
–0.030






     (0.12)
–0.024**
     (0.01)
–0.247
     (0.17)
–0.025**
     (0.01)
–0.067**
     (0.02)
–4.359**
     (1.04)
0.022
     (0.02)
0.316**
     (0.06)
0.102






     (0.14)
–0.028**
     (0.01)
–0.158
     (0.18)
–0.039**
     (0.01)
–0.074**
     (0.02)
–4.832**
     (1.07)
0.033*
     (0.02)
0.278**
     (0.07)
0.055






     (0.19)
–0.014
     (0.01)
0.143
     (0.14)
–0.033**
     (0.01)
0.026
     (0.03)
1.145
     (1.23)
–0.011
     (0.01)
–0.065
     (0.10)
0.007





Table B4. The Impact of  De Jure Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis with Instrumental
VariablesaFull sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector





Table B5. The Impact of the L1 Index of De Facto Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis






















* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our control
variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000 people, and the labor
regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by
geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based
on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression









































































































9.66Full sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector





Table B6. The Impact of the L1 Index of De Facto Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis






















* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our control
variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000 people, and the labor
regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by
geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based
on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression









































































































9.95Full sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector





Table B7. The Impact of the L2 Index of De Facto Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis






















* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our control
variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000 people, and the labor
regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by
geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based
on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression









































































































9.49Full sample Developing countries
Time fixed Country fixed Time fixed Country fixed
Explanatory variable Pooled effects effects Pooled effects effects
Output per capita (in logs)




Physicians per 1,000 people
Inflation
Size of the modern sector





Table B8. The Impact of the L2 Index of De Facto Regulations: Panel Data Regression Analysis






















* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equations (2) and (3) in the text. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient (0–1). Our control
variables are output per capita (in logs), output per capita squared, secondary schooling, liquid liabilities, inflation, size of the modern sector, physicians per 1,000 people, and the labor
regulation indicator. The pooled regressions include a constant. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by
geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the government, British legal origin, German legal origin, and institutionalized autocracy; this set of instruments was chosen based
on the existing literature, following Djankov and others (2003). Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Full regression
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